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Measuring Economic Stabilization:
1955-65
By WAYNE W. SNYDER*
A recent study by Bent Hansen (1969)
gives the institutional background to
budgetary action and an analysis of the
nature and effect of fiscal policy for each of
seven OECD countries: Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The
Hansen study uses three measures to
characterize the impact of budget changes:
the average annual effect on domestic
demand, the effect on the secular rate of
GNP growth, and the short-term stabiliza-
tion around the trend of actual GNP. The
study did not measure their effects in rela-
tion to potential (i.e., full employment)
GNP. Partly, this was because there were
no officially recognized estimates of the
level of domestic demand appropriate to
maintain full employment growth for each
country. For three of these countries-
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States-estimates of potential out-
put now exist, and my purpose is to supple-
ment the Hansen study by comparing the
total impact of budget changes with these
optimum levels of GNP.
I. Measuring the Impact of
Budget Changes1
This study measures the combined
* Center for Research on Economic Development,
University of Michigan. This article was suggested by
J. C. R. Dow, who first pushed for an OECD evaluation
of fiscal policies. More fundamentally, however, I am
indebited to Bent Hansen for the two very rewarding
years that I assisted him on the study. The final version
benefitted from their comments on an earlier draft,
and from many useful suggestions of my colleagues
Harold Shapiro and Lester Taylor, a referee, and the
editor. Janet Eckstein helped by proposing several
editorial changes.
1 For a complete description of the methods used to
measure budgetary effects, see Hansen 1969, ch. 1.
budgetary impact on domestic demand of
both automatic and discretionary effects
of budget changes.2 This includes the
direct impact brought about by the initial
budget change as well as the subsequent
indirect or "multiplier" effect.3 The defini-
tions and methods employed to estimate
the total effect are the ones developed by
Hansen and are based on earlier contribu-
tions of E. Cary Brown, Bent Hansen
(1959), Assar Lindbeck (1956), and Rich-
ard Musgrave. Although the Hansen
model is small compared with the large
econometric models which have been
developed for some countries, it is ade-
quate to measure the relative importance
of budget changes between countries. Due
to the lack of quarterly data for all seven
countries, the model uses only year-to-
year changes, and there are no lags.4 The
model assumes that private investment
and exports are exogenously determined.
Imports are endogenous and for some
countries, e.g., Sweden, represent the
$ In a growing economy where the "fiscal drag" from
automatic tax increases can be important, albeit com-
pensated to varying degrees by built-in expenditure
programs with expansionary effects, narrowly defined
discretionary effects may be the appropriate measure if
short-term stabilization is the primary interest. The
Hansen study does, in fact, provide separate estimates
for both automatic and discretionary effects, but my
concern here is with the budget's total impact on achiev-
ing balanced growth.
' An "accelerator" effect should be included too, but
(as will be explained later) the actual model assumed
that all changes in private investment were exogenously
determined; hence the measurement of the budgetary
impact is limited in this respect as well as by the others
described further on.
4 A review of several big models suggests that three-
fourths or more of the budget effect generally occurs
during the first year, hence the absence of explicit lags is
not critical. See Hansen (1969, pp. 20-22) for a discus-
sion of this subject.
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principal leakage of potential budget
effects.
The Hansen methodology for estimating
automatic and discretionary budget ef-
fects separately, does include automatic
tax response rates but these are not neces-
sary to calculate the combined budgetary
impact, or the "total effect" of budget
changes. Hansen's formula for this is based
on a truncated version of his model and
allows for all changes in revenue which are
not credit transactions and for all pur-
chases of goods and services, except direct
government imports which are excluded
because they do not affect domestic de-
mand. Thus, the only formula used in this
study is the following:
1
Total Effect = 1 [(dg + ds)
1-a(1 - y) g
+a(1-p)(gdp0 + sdp,)
-(1 -g)dT - a(l -Iy)dTd]
where a is the marginal propensity to con-
sume; p is the marginal propensity to im-
port with respect to GNP; dg and ds are
annual changes in the volume of goods and
services, respectively, purchased by gov-
ernment; gdp, and sdp, are changes in the
value of goods and services due to price or
wage changes; dT and dTd are annual
changes in indirect and direct personal
taxes. The multipliers for the various types
of budget changes differ of course between
countries because of differences in the
leakage coefficients-the marginal pro-
pensity to consume and, especially, the
marginal propensity to import. Leakage
coefficients and multipliers are given in
Table 1.
If the consumption coefficients seem
small, this is because a is the ratio of
changes in personal consumption to
changes in total private income minus only
direct household taxes, a definition re-
quired because the model does not include
an explicit corporate sector.5 The expendi-
SAll models have their deficiencies, and Hansen's is






Sweden 0.80 0.40 1.92 0.92 1.15
United Kingdom 0.68 0.28 1.96 0.96 1.41
United States 0.75 0.05 3.48 2.48 3.30
Source: Hansen (1969, pp. 46-47).
ture multipliers may seem large, but it
should be noted that they refer to budget
effects excluding tax leakages which are
accounted for by explicitly including dTs
and dTd (scaled by their appropriate multi-
pliers, too). The corresponding multipliers
which include tax leakage coefficients (in-
stead of dT1 and dTd) are substantially
lower; for example, the multiplier for
changes in the volume of government
purchases of domestically produced goods
and services in the United States is 3.48
without tax leakages but only 2.12 after
allowing for normal tax increases. While
the multipliers cannot be accepted as being
exact or applicable for every budget
change, they are, nevertheless, sufficiently
representative to indicate relative orders
of magnitude and the range of differences
between countries.
The choice of which governmental
sector's budget changes to include (i.e.,
central, state-local, social security, public
enterprise investment) was based on the
budget policies that seemed to be sub-
stantially influenced by the central gov-
ernment. On this basis, budget changes
no exception. In this respect, perhaps the most con-
spicuous features are that private investment is treated
as an exogenous variable and that the corporate sector
is not made explicit. The first can be explained by the
inadequate knowledge about investment functions,
especially for European countries; the second was
necessary to maintain comparability among the oriinal
seven countries, because the national accounts do not all
give corporate profits and taxes separate from personal
income and taxes, notably Sweden for which business
savings contain an important error item.
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include the general government plus the
investments of public enterprises for
Sweden and the United Kingdom, but only
the federal government (including the
federally financed portion of the social
security sector) for the United States.
II. Evaluating Economic Stability
and Growth
The key quantities considered in this
study are actual and potential GNP, and
the total effect of budget changes. Figure 1
shows for each country how actual GNP
(in constant 1958 prices) developed be-
tween 1955 and 1965 in relation to poten-
tial output. Official estimates of potential
GNP are available for two countries:
W. A. H. Godley and J. R. Shepherd's
estimates are used for the United Kingdom,
and those made by the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors (Jan. 1970) are used
for the United States. Erick Lundberg's
estimates are used for Sweden. Estimates
of potential output are, of course, some-
what problematic because they are not
independent of economic policy; govern-
ment policy affects the distribution of out-
put between consumption and investment,
and this dearly influences the rate of
growth of the labor force and productivity.
But in spite of these limitations, they pro-
vide a useful basis for evaluating budgetary
performance if they are discussed in rela-
tion to other policy objectives and instru-
ments.
The total effect of budget changes should
not be directly compared with actual and
potential GNP because actual GNP is
itself influenced by budget changes. We
can, however, construct a hypothetical
series of GNP by subtracting from actual
GNP the total effect for each year. This
derived series is called the "pure cycle,"
because it attempts to estimate what
GNP would have been each year without
the budgetary impact. The pure cycle still
incorporates the effects of other govern-
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Trend rate of growth 3 1/2% through 1962 and
3 3/4% afterwards
FIGURE 1.-GROSS NATIONAL PRODUcT:
ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
(Constant 1958 Prices)
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ment policies (e.g., monetary and direct
controls) and autonomous forces (e.g.,
private investment and exports). Hence,
the pure cycle is not so pure, but neverthe-
less it is a useful analytical construct.
In Figures 2 (Sweden), 3 (United King-
dom), and 4 (United States), actual GNP
and the pure cycle are expressed as per-
centage deviations from potential output,
shown for convenience as a horizontal line.
The vertical difference between actual
GNP and the pure cycle for each year is
equivalent to the estimated total effect of
budget changes. The arrows indicate the
direction of the total effect and point from
the pure cycle to the actual GNP.
The GNP development given in Figure 2
for Sweden is different than for the two
other countries because in seven out of the
eleven years, actual GNP was virtually
identical with potential output, and this
required dampening as well as expansion-
ary budget policies, with annual total
effects which amounted to 2 and 3 percent
of potential GNP. Perhaps this is not sur-
prising, since for several decades fiscal
policies have been accepted and employed
to manage the Swedish economy, for which
Lindbeck (1968) points out that the first
" . . . deliberate counter-cyclical fiscal
policies [were] introduced as early as 1933"
(p. 33).
The extraordinary flexibility and power
of fiscal policy when properly employed is
illustrated by the Swedish experience of
1959 and 1960. Following the worldwide
recession in 1958 which budget policies
helped partially eliminate, the total effect
of budget changes gave an expansionary
push of 3 percent which helped carry de-
mand up to potential output. As the re-
covery progressed, the budget policies
were reversed. For 1960, the budget
switched to a dampening of 3 percent-
just the amount needed to keep the econ-
omy at virtually its full potential for both
1959 and 1960. The only mistakes occurred
GNP (Potential)
1955 56 57 58 59 60 si 62 63 64 1965
FIGURE 2.-SWEDEN
in 1964 and 1965, when expansionary
policies fueled an already overheated econ-
omy, which was brought back into bal-
ance only after 1965.
As for the other main economic objec-
tives, Sweden did not. have any serious
problems concerning the balance of pay-
ments equilibrium, but this was not true of
relative price stability. Current account
difficulties occasionally required some
minor adjustments of domestic policies,
but over the period as a whole Sweden ran
a sufficiently large surplus on its basic
account to permit doubling its interna-
tional reserves between 1955 and 1965.
Prices increased on average more in Swe-
den than in either the United Kingdom or
the United States, but not as much as for
some other European countries. Lundberg
suggests that " . . . a serious criticism of
the type of stabilization policy pursued in
Sweden is that during most of the time it
involved a combination of inflationary
pressure and extensive controls of the
credit and capital markets" (p. 199) while
at the same time " ... there has been no
effort by the Swedish government to carry
out an 'income policy' or interfere with the
bargaining process on the labor market"
(p. 248). If these considerations should
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have received higher priority, then clearly
greater slack in the labor market should
have prevailed, which means that poten-
tial output would have been lower. But
even if a somewhat higher level of un-
employment was used to calculate poten-
tial GNP, the stabilization achieved would
still remain impressive. Furthermore, Swe-
den used a very sophisticated and effective
method to provide investment funds to
firms in a countercyclical manner; if quan-
titative estimates of these policies were
made, the picture of Sweden's already
impressive budgetary performance would
be further improved.6 In sum, Sweden
during all but the last two years of the pe-
riod between 1955 and 1965 presents a re-
markable picture of the effectiveness of
using budgetary policies to achieve eco-
nomic stability and growth.
The United Kingdom's budgetary per-
formance is striking by comparison with
Sweden's. The requirements for domestic
demand management were similar in both
countries, but U.K. policymakers did very
little to alter the course of events. Except
for the years 1955 and 1965, the total
effect of budget changes never greatly ex-
ceeded 1 percent of potential output; thus,
in spite of its "stop/go" policies, budget
changes had little influence on the under-
lying pattern of cyclical fluctuations. It is
particularly important, however, to recall
the lack of purity in the pure cycle, which
includes the effects of monetary policies;
for example, variations in down-payments
and the length of maturity requirements
for consumer credit on durable goods were
especially important at various times.
Unlike the other six countries in the
Hansen study, the United Kingdom ac-
centuated rather than reduced the gap be-
tween potential and actual GNP during
the 1958 recession. Prices had been rising
sharply for several quarters, and policies
6 See Lundberg (pp. 225-32) and Gunnar Eliasson for
descriptions and evaluations of this scheme.
were designed partly to counteract this
and partly to discourage further specula-
tion against sterling, such as the short-
lived crisis of 1957. The result was, a
reduction in domestic demand at a time
when unemployment was already rising to
what in England was considered an intoler-
able level.7
This experience is typical of the prob-
lems that plagued the United Kingdom
throughout this period. The definitive
analysis of the British postwar experience,
the low rate of growth (lowest among the
seven countries in the Hansen study),
how much higher a rate might have been
attained if policies had been different,
the many balance of payments crises, and
the problems with rising prices, is still to be
written. Until this is done, J. C. R. Dow's
study will remain the most complete
analysis, in which he asserts that ". . . the
major fluctuations in the rate of growth of
demand in the years after 1952 were thus
chiefly due to government policy" (p. 384).
And he also concludes that: "If the pres-
sure of demand had been somewhat lower
and the margin of capacity somewhat
larger ... the pressure of demand could
have had a marked effect on the rise of
prices (p. 361) . . . and would probably
have reduced fluctuation in the balance
of payments.. . " (p. 392).
The minimum that needs to be said re-
garding these propositions is that if the
potential output used is considered to have
been too optimistic as regards price and
balance-of-payments developments, given
?Samuel Brittain has described the relation between
employment and the balance of payment restraint prior
to 1965 in the following way:
If unemployment (after allowing for the purely
seasonal element) is down to 1.5% the balance of
payments will usually be given priority; and the
Treasury would not be deterred from depressing
home demand by the thought of unemployment
rising to say 1.8%. But if the number out of work
is much higher than this at the time of the Budget,
risks may sometimes be taken with the balance of
payments for the sake of domestic expansion.
[p. 105]
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actual budgetary policies, then lowering it
would make the policies even less appro-
priate. And this conclusion is not affected
by the exclusion of variations in corporate
taxes and the various investment allow-
ance schemes which were used throughout
the period. Corporate tax payments lag as
much as two years behind the time that
profits are being earned, and hence tend
to produce pro rather than counter cyclical
effects, and when discretionary changes in
corporate tax rates and changes in the sys-
tem of investment allowances are com-
bined, they produce an even greater
destabilizing impact on domestic demand.
If differences between Sweden and the
United Kingdom as illustrated in Figures 2
and 3 are striking, the United States pre-
sents yet another situation. The problem
of economic management was not the fine
tuning of demand at full employment
which characterized both Sweden and the
United Kingdom, but rather dealing with
the increasing tendency of demand to
diverge from potential output after 1955.
The annual budget impacts unquestion-
ably helped to dampen fluctuations of
actual GNP, but they did relatively little
to assist the economy to regain full em-
ployment. Figure 4 makes it clear that the















appropriate during 1959 and 1960; the
same is true for 1963 and 1965, albeit to a
lesser degree. Only in 1955 were the effects
entirely adequate. The destabilizing effects
in years of post-recession recovery are
mainly due to the strong automatic
stabilizers, as noted by Wilfred Lewis; al-
though they greatly help to limit the
severity of recessions, they reverse direc-
tion quickly after the trough is passed and
hinder recovery to full employment.
Balance-of-payments equilibrium and
relative price stability are other objectives
which need to be considered in discussing
economic stability and growth, but neither
is as important for the United States as for
the United Kingdom. Toward the end ofFIGURE 3.-UNITED KINGDOM
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the 1950's the U.S. policymakers became
increasingly concerned about the con-
tinual balance of payments deficits, but no
specific budget policies for these purposes
were adopted at any time during the period
from 1955 through 1965, although some
monetary policies were directed to the ob-
jective of improving the balance of pay-
ments. In presenting the 1963 tax reduc-
tion proposals, it was even suggested that
the subsequent expansion toward full em-
ployment might eventually help the bal-
ance of payments by encouraging Ameri-
can companies to invest less overseas and
more at home.8
Price considerations did, however, play a
more important role but to a large extent
they are inseparable from the assumption
that a 4 percent level of unemployment is
compatible with potential output and with
little or no inflationary pressure. While the
Eisenhower administration did not specify
what trade off it thought existed between
price stability and unemployment, clearly
it recognized a linkage and was more con-
cerned about the rising consumer prices
from 1955 until 1959, which were fairly
large by American standards (on average
about 2 percent annually), than it was
about reducing the level of unemployment
to 4 percent. The Kennedy administration
did make explicit its goals and did believe
that it was possible to reduce unemploy-
ment to at least 4 percent while maintain-
ing relative price stability. Perhaps it
would be more reasonable to propose a
potential GNP corresponding closer to 5
percent unemployment for the years prior
to 1961. If this were done the amount of
divergence between the pure cycle and
potential GNP would be smaller and con-
sequently the amount of stabilization
achieved would be somewhat greater. The
importance of this should not, however, be
overemphasized; even with such an ad-
justment, the U.S. economy functioned
8 See Council of Economic Advisors (Jan. 1963, p.
103).
well below its potential throughout most of
the period.
It is not a major purpose of this study to
explain why policies were inadequate but
it can be noted that throughout the Eisen-
hower administration there was a general
feeling that the economy would reach an
appropriately high level of economic ac-
tivity without the discretionary use of
government policies. And as late as Jan-
uary 1962 the new Kennedy administra-
tion believed that the economy could
achieve a 4 percent level of unemployment
by mid-1963 without any major discre-
tionary policies beyond the investment
credit scheme and accelerated depreciation
allowances which it proposed to increase
investment and productivity.9 Eventually,
of course, the substantial tax cuts of 1964
and 1965 were required in order to boost
the economy toward potential GNP, and
not until 1966 did expenditures related to
the Vietnam war finally raise the economy
to its full potential, after a decade of in-
adequate demand.
III. Comparing Relative Stabilization
Although important issues of methodol-
ogy and interpretation which cannot be
neglected are raised in this section, a
tentative and quantitative evaluation of
the relative degree of stabilization achieved
by the three countries seems appropriate.
First some definitions, and then the con-
ceptual problems are discussed.
The absolute difference between the
pure cycle and potential GNP is defined as
potential stabilization. Budget effects are
counted as stabilizing if they diminish the
difference and destabilizing if they increase
it. The total effects whose arrows in
Figures 2, 3, and 4 point towards potential
GNP are counted as helping to achieve
economic stability, and in those years when
they point away the budgetary impact is
counted as being destabilizing.
*See Council of Economic Advisors (Jan. 1962, p. 66
and p. 132).
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Budget policies are nowhere uniquely
designed for the management of domestic
demand; other objectives sometimes over-
ride stabilization considerations, nor are
budget policies the only means by which
objectives can be attained.10 Consider for
example an extreme situation where the
budgetary impact is always in the wrong
direction, i.e., causing demand to diverge
from potential GNP. If, however, the bud-
get effects are precisely forecast and if
other government policies are used to
eliminate exactly whatever difference
would exist, ceteris paribus, between the
pure cycle and potential output, then the
economy would always be at its full poten-
tial but all the stabilizing effects would be
attributed to the budgetary impact rather
then the other policies which were the real
reason for maintaining full employment.1'
Such possibilities cannot be denied but
their importance must be viewed in light of
individual experience. In the United States
during ten of the eleven years from 1955
through 1965, actual GNP remained be-
low-often substantially below-potential
output, the cumulated shortfall amounting
to nearly 50 percent of a typical year's
potential GNP (measured in 1958 prices).
On the other hand, throughout this period
domestic demand in both Sweden and the
United Kindgom fluctuated within a nar-
row band between nearly full and (more
often) overfull employment. In these cases
the possibility does exist that some stabil-
izing effects which are attributed to the
budgetary impact properly belong to the
counter-balancing effects of other govern-
ment policies. While this study makes no
attempt to evaluate the effects of other
government policies, it is worth mentioning
that Sweden and the United Kingdom
used monetary policy mainly for balance-
10 E. S. Kirshen's study lists eight major conjunctural
and structural objectives and four minor targets; and
the same study enumerates no fewer than sixty-five in-
struments available to achieve them. ..
SThe referee pointed out the ambiguity caused by
this conceptual problem.
of-payments purposes which had, if any-
thing, adverse rather than stabilizing
effects on the appropriate management of
domestic demand.
This does not exhaust all the conceptual
problems; at least one more should be
discussed. In cases where the budgetary
impact is in the right direction but exceeds
the amount necessary to reach potential
output, how should the total effect be
calculated? It seemed sensible to divide the
impact into two components: the part that
was stabilizing, and the other which over-
shot and had destabilizing effects. In fact,
such situations were rare, never occurring in
either Sweden or the United States; the
only clear case occurred in the United
Kindgom in 1962 when the total effect was
about twice as strong as necessary to
dampen the overheated economy and
created some undesirable unemployment.
With these definitions and caveats in
mind, we can make the following evalua-
tion of the budgetary impact and its con-
tribution to achieving economic stability
in the three countries. Table 2 summarizes
the pertinent relationships on a cumulated
basis for the eleven-year period.
First, the cumulated amount of poten-
tial stabilization (Item 1) for Sweden and
the United Kingdom amounted to about
20 percent (of a typical year potential out-
put), while for the United States it
amounted to 55 percent. Second, one-third
of Sweden's desirable stabilization and
most of the United Kingdom's would have
required a dampening budget impact
whereas for the United States-except for
the year 1955-stabilization required ex-
pansionary policies.
There were notable differences among
the three countries concerning the stabiliz-
ing impact of budget changes (Item 2). In
Sweden the cumulated impact had a size-
able stabilizing effect, and it occurred when
the pure cycle was above potential GNP as
well as when it was below it.
In the United Kingdom the stabilizing
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TABLE 2-TOTAL Er
ECONOMIC STABILIZ.
(expressed as a percent
cumulated for 1955
1. Total (absolute) divergence be-




2. Sum of stabilizing effects
a) Above potential
b) Below potential
3. Sum of destabilizing effects
a) Above potential
b) Below potential




5. Total divergence between ac-




6. Net stabilization achieved
(4+1)
c-rS AND tively small for both Sweden and the
tage and United Kindgom and somewhat larger for
-65). the United States (Item 3). All of Sweden's
destabilizing effects contributed to pushing
United actual GNP above its potential. In the
Swe- King- United United States the situation was exactlyden dom States
reversed, as the destabilizing impact of
budget changes contributed to increasing
21.0 18.6 55.4 the gap between potential and actual
7.7 16.6 5.1 GNP. The "stop/go" policies of the United
13.3 2.0 50.3 Kingdom are reflected in the destabilizing
15.7 7.3 16.9 effects, which sometimes caused overheat-
4.7 7.1 5.1 ing and sometimes contributed to depress-
11.0 0.2 11.8 ing GNP below its potential level.
2.3 2.3 7.3 When the stabilizing and destabilizing
2.3 0.5 0.0 effects are combined to obtain the net
0.0 1.8 7.3 effects (Item 4), and when these are com-
pared with the potential stabilization
13.4 5.0 9.6 which could have been achieved (Item 1),
2.4 6.6 5.1 there are striking differences between the11.0 -1.6b 4.5
three countries. For Sweden, the potential
stabilization which could have been
7.6 13.6 45.8 achieved was not very large to begin with,
5.3 10.0 0.0 but 64 percent of it was accomplished; a
2.3 3.6 45.8 remarkable achievement by itself but
particularly important when compared
63.8 26.9 17.3 with the mediocre performance of the
other two countries. The potential stabil-
d for general govern- ization which could have been achieved inblic enterprises for
, but only for the the United Kingdom was smallest among
ates; the choice was the three countries, and in fact the effects
,re substantially in-e sof budget changes were no larger than
ng effects. those of Sweden ; the net result was that 27
percent of the potential stabilization was
achieved. The United States had two and
and were con- one-half to three times as much potential
in dampening stabilization to be achieved, but the net
I economy. In stabilizing effects of its budget changes
nsionary effects were relatively small-only 17 percent.
reden, but since The cumulated divergence between ac-
the pure cycle tual and potential GNP for the entire
o much greater eleven-year period (Item 5) was smallest
States as com- for Sweden (only 7.6 percent), somewhat
.t for Sweden), larger for the United Kingdom (13.6 per-
stabilization cent), and much larger for the United
ess. States (45.8 percent). For both Sweden
nig destabilizing and the United Kingdom, most of the
they were rela- divergence arose from an overheated econ-
I
a Budgetary effects were measure
ment plus the investments of pu
Sweden and the United Kingdom
federal government of the United St
based on what budget policies we
fluenced by the central government
b Minus sign indicates destabilizi
effects were not very large
centrated almost entirely
the potentially overheated
the United States the expai
were about as large as in Sw
the cumulated shortfall of
below potential GNP was s
(50 percent for the United
pared with only 13 percen
the relative amount of
achieved was substantially i
No country escaped havii
effects in some years, but 1
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omy where actual GNP exceeded poten-
tial output, although for each country some
short-falls did occur. For the United
States, however, the entire amount repre-
sented the short-fall of actual below poten-
tial GNP.
IV. Conclusion
An important finding of the Hansen
1969 study was that if short-run stabiliza-
tion is measured with respect to the actual
trend rate of GNP growth, then the degree
of stabilization achieved in the United
States was substantially larger than for
any other country during the eleven years
from 1955 through 1965 and was modestly
important for Sweden, while in the United
Kingdom the impact of budget changes
was actually destabilizing and created
greater fluctuations in the rate of GNP
growth than would have occurred if the
budget had been neutral from year to year.
If potential instead of actual GNP is
used, the results are strikingly different.
The total impact of budget changes in
Sweden eliminated nearly two-thirds of
the gap between the pure cycle and poten-
tial GNP and helped create a level of
demand that was virtually identical with
potential output during a majority of the
years. The United Kingdom's performance
also is improved, from a generally destabil-
izing pattern to one where about one-
quarter of the potential stabilization was
achieved. The change in the United States'
performance is less surprising because it is
already widely recognized that while the
budgetary impact-mainly the automatic
built-in stabilizers-helped dampen short-
run fluctuations, during the period from
1955 through 1965 the economy slipped
below 95 percent of its full employment
potential during half of the years. Con-
sequently, the amount of stabilization
achieved by this more relevant criteria was
only 17 percent.
The reader must, however, interpret
these conclusions with caution, keeping in
mind the other main economic objectives
besides achieving a high level of employ-
ment and growth, principally relative price
stability and balance of payments equilib-
rium.
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